Cities around the world are developing new ways of governing risks and vulnerabilities. In the new flood-governance measures, technological risk-prevention is linked to programmes of social resilience and cultural adaptation. By focusing on the governance of catastrophic floods in the city of Villahermosa, Mexico, this essay argues that new flood-governance strategies rely on complicated forms of neoliberal governance, in which flood governance is turned into a matter of adaptation and self-responsibilisation, while scant attention is paid to the socio-spatial distribution of vulnerabilities. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in three, socially differentiated neighbourhoods of Villahermosa in 2011-2014, this study demonstrates how flood-governance strategies and the residents' responses to them vary across the city and how the production of flood risk is connected to the uneven production of the urban space. The institutional acts of governing aim to render certain groups of population governable, whilst being unable to eradicate dispersed contestation efforts.
challenge the positions ascribed to them?
Compared to the rich research on inequality and social segregation in Latin America 6 , urban environmental governance has received less attention. 7 Furthermore, the studies that do exist concentrate on marginal settlements. This study focuses on three socioeconomically differentiated sectors of Villahermosa: 1) Tabasco 2000, which is a highincome residential and business-centred area; 2) El Guayabal, which is a middle-income neighbourhood; and 3) Gaviotas Sur, which is a low-income, informal settlement and an ambulatory trade area ( 5 differentiated outcomes. 8 As Pelling notes in his study of Guyana, the technology exists to map environmental risks, build safe houses and design sustainable cities. 9 The problem is rather that prevalent governance structures and power relations often undermine efforts towards more socially just procedures. This is especially true in many Southern cities, where large numbers of people live in substandard settlements with high levels of poverty, while urban elites isolate themselves in gated communities, with exclusive sanitation, health-care and security services. 10 Through an ethnographic analysis of institutional flood-governance strategies and local tactics of reconfiguration and contestation, the following analysis shows how the currently dominant forms of flood governance aim to render certain groups of populations governable, whilst being unable to eradicate dispersed efforts of contestation.
Theoretical approaches: Hybrid governance and inverse governmentality
This study draws upon a theoretical approach of post-Foucauldian governmentality in order to analyse how the institutional strategies of flood governance are socio-spatially differentiated across the city and how the production of flood risk is linked to the socially differentiated production of urban space. 
Villahermosa as a panorama of risk and vulnerability
Villahermosa, the capital of the State of Tabasco, has about one million inhabitants. The oil boom in the 1980s led to the city's rapid population growth, as work opportunities offered by the oil industry and the service sector brought large numbers of migrants to the region.
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Villahermosa is situated on the tropical wetlands, mainly less than ten metres above the sea level. Two great rivers -the River Grijalva and the River Carrizal -traverse the city and there are dozens of lagoons, many of which have been filled for construction purposes. Due to its location, Villahermosa is exposed to extreme hydro-meteorological events. As 31 per cent of the Mexican freshwater sources are located in Tabasco, and the region is also one of the main areas of oil and natural-gas extraction in the country, the challenges faced by the government authorities in relation to flood governance are extraordinarily high. could no longer be reduced to a technical problem; rather flood risk is, according to them, a socio-cultural phenomenon. It was especially the civil engineers responsible for flood management who emphasised to me that technological flood control is not sufficient for preventing devastating floods; they considered social capacity-building and civic selfresponsibilisation key for successful governance.
This 'social turn' in flood governance placed considerable emphasis on cultural adaptation to risk. Interestingly, government authorities and flood consultants understood the socially constructed character of risks as indicating that different people have different cultural capabilities for adapting to floods. Slum-dwellers were regarded as indifferent to build a safe living environment because they were considered to lack a thorough understanding of the risks. After the 2007 flood, the Governor of Tabasco appeared in the media exhorting 'people to calm down and stop spreading false rumours'. 37 Such rumorología was especially considered characteristic of the poor, who officials saw as reluctant to adapt to living with water. In this way, vulnerability was linked to cultural attitudes of indifference, with scant attention given to the socio-economic conditions that make some people more vulnerable than others. Simultaneously, this turn to social resilience, with a strong emphasis on the cultural awareness of the risk, delegitimized the extensive government interventions on flood-risk prevention.
While flood governance in earlier decades focused on controlling the urban territory through massive infrastructure projects, current flood governance is oriented towards governing urban populations. These procedures are implemented not only through legislation and public regulation, but increasingly through public-private co-governance and marketbased incentives, including privatisation of water, sanitation and waste-management services.
In order to diminish the costs of public spending, the government outsources various flood- 37 Tabasco Hoy, 02.11.2007. management tasks and service provisions to private (sub)contractors and civil-society groups.
These measures challenge the view of the state as the sole service provider, whilst replacing the notion of public services with that of private provisions.
Different from earlier, government-led flood-control policies, current mechanisms of flood governance give civic self-responsibilisation a key role. As several officials explained to me, whereas in the 2000s, environmental-policy guidelines were drafted as rigorous rules to be obeyed, currently, the government prioritises civic involvement and self-responsibilisation. 38 As the Development Plan of Tabasco (PEOT) emphasises, the government's role is to facilitate citizens to develop their own initiatives to care for their living conditions and mitigate their own vulnerability. These skills were considered crucial when promoting self-responsibility, as a government coordinator of participatory programmes noted:
It's important to incorporate local leaders in our actions because the leaders know how to manage people. We want to prevent flood risk from turning into political problems, and What was interesting in these comments was the issue that both the government authorities and the development facilitators considered the participatory programmes as apolitical, while also identifying them as a way to confront local resistance. Similarly, they claimed that flood risks are socially constructed, but unconnected to the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities. Through calculating comments, authorities simultaneously constructed civic participation as apolitical and as a politically efficient way to control social mobilisation.
In line with neoliberal thinking, the authorities responsible for flood governance emphasised that it is important that people readopt the traditional way of 'living with water' (convivir con el agua) and the time-honoured 'culture of water' (cultura del agua). They We cannot conquer Nature; rather, we need strategies of adaptation and self-regulation.
We now have integrated schemes of governance, where we involve actors from different levels of government, from the private sector and NGOs to work with local residents.
Earlier, people adjusted to the reality that this is a zone of water. When the flood was over, they returned to their homes, cleaned their houses and continued to live normally. for heightened flood risk and should transform themselves from nonchalant slum-dwellers into responsible citizens.
Authorities have paid scant attention to how the uneven provision of services distinguishes neighbourhoods in terms of vulnerability, and how multi-scale urban policy sustains differentiated citizenship, where public services become privileges, granted according to people's socio-economic status. 41 The lack of political will to apply risk- 'it's a pity that these citizens don't understand that the removal is for their own security, as these areas are not apt for residence, and thus don't have any services'. According to archival data, plans to relocate these people have existed since the 1990s; however, political 
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public scrutiny.
Despite the official arguments that flood governance is everyone's responsibility, the reality is that civil society is fragile and local elites dominate decisionmaking. Government authorities control social protest by arguing that co-governance requires cooperation instead of scandalisation. By promoting outsourcing and public-private cogovernance that diffuse questions of responsibility, authorities seek to depoliticise the flood issue. The social-justice and human-rights advocates, when their voices are heard, try to repoliticise the matter by claiming that flood governance cannot be outsourced to private or civil-society actors, but that it is the government's responsibility to address public concerns related to flooding.
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Current flood-governance techniques also aim to transform environmental uncertainties into manageable risks. The officials of the Instituto de Protección Civil (IPC) frequently reminded me that 'it's important to give the view that flood risk is under institutional control'. 47 However, due to heightened doubts about the possibility to technologically control the risk, the flood consultants and government authorities emphasised that flood governance needs to be conducted primarily from a socio-cultural point of view.
The authorities noted that 'if people don't respect water, it will take revenge and recover what is its own', which makes it obligatory to develop strategies for 'allying with water'. 48 In their view, the knowledge that flood-management specialists gain through techniques of remote sensing and risk scenarios should be integrated with the knowledge of development which, according to some critics, focus on the efforts of planners and programmers to govern marginalised people 52 , the next section explores how residents in different parts of the city understood themselves within the regimes designed to govern their subjectivities. It also looks at how residents renegotiated and contested the prevalent arts of governing.
Everyday contingencies and contestations

Dispersed identities and multifaceted inverse tactics
The government authorities' and flood consultants' goals to create segregated zones of 'sustainable living' in Villahermosa clashed with the messiness of everyday life. Residents from different parts of the city challenged the disciplinary forms of neoliberal governance through tactics of inverse governmentality. 53 In Gaviotas Sur, residents regularised their land occupations through intermittent house-renovation projects. They filled their plots with sand and waste to demonstrate to the authorities that they are living within the flood-risk limits.
They renovated their simple huts with concrete and corrugated iron to show that their homes are built with durable materials and thus according to standards required by the rules for 51 Dean, Governmentality, pp. 30-37. 52 Mckee, 'Post-Foucauldian Governmentality', p. 479. The officials have to serve us better because we are those who raise the city, who pay a large amount of taxes. People here in Tabasco 2000 do not feel the floods in the same 29 way as those in Gaviotas Sur. It's because of cultural difference. Here, we don't throw waste into the streets because it provokes flooding…In Gaviotas Sur, people don't care.
The government cannot protect them because they just settle wherever. They don't have sewers, or potable water. And they don't pay taxes.
(Julio, 11 October 2011)
Justifying their own positions, the affluent and middle-class residents demanded that authorities provide their neighbourhoods with efficient water storage systems and backup generators to eliminate unnecessary disturbances in their daily lives. 55 Simultaneously, they stressed that the poor needed to stop to asking for governmental help for everything because being a successful citizen requires self-achievement. Many of them supported the authorities' efforts to remove informal residents from the city centre, based on the argument that slumdwellers and ambulatory traders 'don't obey the laws' and are a 'source of environmental and social disorder'.
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The residents of Gaviotas Sur contested the affluent and middle-class residents'
views of their privileged positions by emphasising everyone's right to a safe living environment. They questioned the privatisation of public services, claiming that the government has a responsibility to provide basic amenities and disaster prevention, for every neighbourhood. At the same time, these informal residents struggled for official recognition of their alternative ways of living, which included many aspects that the authorities categorised as illicit. In the precarious settlements, where the basic infrastructure was rarely the result of public policy, people enacted diverse tactics to cope with deficiency. For them, the few green-spaces in their neighbourhood were a source of fear because they were places where one might be at risk of a sudden flood or an assault. For security reasons, parents preferred their children to play in a busy street rather than an isolated park. 63 Hence, the ability to recover after the disaster was linked to socioeconomic status; further, differences stemming from age and gender were also significant.
Women responsible for domestic well-being often suffered the most traumas. Tania Correspondingly, the residents of Tabasco 2000 organised charity activities on behalf of the poor trying to recover from flood contingencies.
In this bustle of class intersections, informal residents made note of the institutional structures that provided affluent residents with privileges in the shape of infrastructure and flood-risk prevention. At the same time, lack of these infrastructures constrained the poor's opportunities for living with dignity amidst the reduced social policies due to neoliberal reforms. Even when the poor were aware of the uneven consequences of the socially differentiated flood governance, they often replicated such an approach in practice.
In many interviews, the residents of Gaviotas Sur reiterated the Governor's message that the 2007 flood reached such a magnitude because they did not obey the authorities' instructions but spread false rumours. As Adriana explained me ashamed:
We lost much during the flood because we didn't pay attention. The Governor announced:
'Go away, because there will be a flood!' But people said: 'How can the Governor know if he is nothing like God?' It was our fault for not obeying the instructions. city. Contrary to the authorities and private consultants, who wanted people to become more self-governed, the residents themselves expected the government to take care of their environmental safety and well-being. At the same time, they contested the governmental efforts of oversight and paternalist control, as the following section shows.
Networks of sporadic resistance
Institutional governance strategies do not deterministically define people's subject-position nor do they determine their behaviour; rather, in everyday life, acts of governing are reformulated through 'quiet encroachments of the ordinary' that occur outside, in spite of and in articulation with, formal governance strategies. 67 This makes it difficult to claim that one strategy falls within the order of 'oppression' and another one in tactics of 'liberation'. 68 By trying to avoid dichotomies between imposed interventions and insurgent inventions, this study conceptualises local contestations as social formations that are dispersed and fragmented, always in-the-making. 69 This is especially so in Villahermosa, where claims to environmental justice are rarely articulated within a frame of organised protest movement.
Many studies of environmental and social-justice struggles focus on movements that are highly progressive and that gather considerable media attention. 70 However, as didn't obey the rules. Thus, the government is not culpable, and so you need to just take care of yourselves and recover'. 73 Through such statements, the cause for flood was disconnected from institutional procedures of governance and urban planning. Furthermore, although noteworthy international and national disaster relief was provided for the victims right after the disaster, people were subsequently urged to develop their own capacities to normalise their lives.
Although the informal residents' demands for improved living conditions sometimes led to politicised demonstrations, contestation through invisible tactics was much more common. Central to these contestations were claims that the flood risk cannot be separated from the institutional deficiencies in flood governance. As a form of everyday resistance, the residents of Gaviotas Sur refused to pay for electricity services. In contrast to electricity companies' accusations that the informal residents were shamelessly stealing electricity, the residents of Gaviotas Sur perceived their illegal electricity networks -called 'diablitos' ('small devils') in the local dialect -as the only fair way to act in a situation where the services provided for them were intermittent and the maximisation of energy production in the operation of dams caused them flood hazards. As Tomas murmured, seeing people wading waist-deep in water in October 2011, when Gaviotas Sur was once again inundated:
This flood is provoked by the government. It smells of dam-water. The authorities allow floods here because they want to produce electricity for other parts of the country. 76 This is especially true in Tabasco, where, due to the region's crucial role in the oil production, the government tends to dilute political mobilisation either by persuasion or force. These fragmented networks of environmental and social-justice turn up and disappear depending on conditions because, as Ronaldo, a social-justice advocate who criticised the forced removal of informal residents explained to me, 'such irregularity makes it difficult for the authorities to know who exercises alternative agency and how'. 77 Other factors that shape the formation of dispersed networks of everyday resistance in Villahermosa include the long-standing structures of segregated urban policy and planning. These structures feed localised community demands, rendering cross-city and cross-class alliances for resistance movements purposeless. In the government's relationship with such mobile contestations, there is a 'continuous attempt to govern those who evade 74 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, 'Parts Unknown: Undercover Ethnography of the Organs-Trafficking Underworld', 40 being governed through rhizomatic networks'. 78 This situation indicates that these mobile efforts to contest governance that incorporates people unevenly into neoliberal policies and economies are strategic, even though this agency rarely manifests itself in the form of organised movements.
Conclusion
Urban environmental governance is a rapidly evolving research field, with high relevance for academic and public-policy understanding of governance, power and politics. The complex relations between the state and the urban poor have been the subject of rich academic analysis. 
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are constantly being modified. 81 Through attention to the multi-vocal perspectives of socially dispersed residents, the study revealed the diversity of tactics through which the residents contested institutional endeavours to govern how they should think and act. At the same time, it demonstrated the uneven access to resources and networks of influence, as well as the fragmented nature of subversive strategies in a context where organised protests were institutionally discouraged. Despite strong efforts to render certain actors and ways of life governable, the dominant discourses and practices of governance were unable to eradicate dispersed contestation efforts.
Given the unprecedented risks, uncertainties and vulnerabilities affecting increasing population in Southern cities, a thorough understanding of the differentiated forms of neoliberal governance and their dynamic contestations in diverse circumstances is crucial.
In urban theory, such analyses can provide important insights into the socially differentiated nature of governance and contested struggles over subjectivity. At the same time, it can contribute to wider discussions concerning the multifaceted relations between governance and justice, material vulnerability and symbolic domination, and institutional responsibility and inverse citizenship. 
